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I. INTRODUCTION
The Oil Platforms case between Iran and the United States was the first
proceeding in the history of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in which
the applicant relied exclusively on a compromissory clause contained in a
bilateral treaty to establish jurisdiction. This restriction mostly affected the
U.S. counter-claim.'
This contribution will focus on the question whether the counter-claim
might be considered, as Iran implied, an example of the inadmissible exercise
of an actio popularis, or a "right resident in any member of a community to
take legal action in vindication of a public interest" 2-in this case, ensuring
safe shipping conditions in the Persian Gulf, an international shipping
channel. It is recalled that in the South West Africa cases, the Court stated that
contemporary international law does not recognize "the equivalent of an 'actio
popularis.'' 3 Four years later, however, the Court explained that a
fundamental distinction must be made between a state's obligations arising
vis-A-vis another state and its obligations towards the international community
as a whole, which by their very nature and importance are the concern of all
states, who can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.4 As
examples of these obligations erga omnes the Court mentioned acts of
aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination. While the Court has
failed to clarify whether every state has the right of espousal with regard to
such obligations, denying the equivalent of an actio popularis in these areas
t Counsel, International Arbitration Group, White & Case LLP, New York City. The author
holds basic and doctoral degrees in International Law from Leiden University, The Netherlands, and an
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1. The counter-claim was held admissible by the Court's Order of March 10, 1998. See Oil
Platforms (Iran. v. U.S.) (Counter-claim), 1998 I.C.J. 190, 206, para. 46 (Mar. 10). The vote was 15-1,
with Judge ad hoc Rigaux, appointed by Iran, dissenting.
2. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Lib. v. S. Afr.) (Second Phase, Judgment), 1966 I.C.J.
6, 47, para. 88 (July 18).
3. Id.
4. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Bel. v. Sp.) (Second Phase, Judgment),
1970 I.C.J. 3, 32, paras. 33-34 (Feb. 5).
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could frustrate their effective protection. The possibility for any state to
complain about unlawful conduct in these areas can be critical, especially
where the state having a direct interest is either unable or unwilling to
complain against the injuring state.
Oil Platforms is not the only case evidencing an increased interest in the
actio popularis doctrine. In the recent LaGrand case between Germany and
the United States, in which Germany advanced claims both in its own right
and through the exercise of diplomatic protection in the interest of German
nationals, Germany also appeared to rely on the actio popularis doctrine by
stating that it was pursuing its claims "not only for the sake of the citizens of
[Germany and the United States], but for the benefit of human beings
worldwide."5 Germany failed, however, to evoke a pronouncement from the
ICJ that a human right to consular notification exists in international law or
that an actio popularis is acceptable in that context. This recent interest
warrants a closer examination of the doctrine in the context of Iran's objection
in this latest case.
II. THE U.S. COUNTER-CLAIM AND IRAN'S OBJECTION
The counter-claim, as formulated in the U.S. Counter-Memorial,
requested the Court to adjudge and declare that "in attacking vessels, laying
mines in the Gulf and otherwise engaging in military actions in 1987-88 that
were dangerous and detrimental to maritime commerce, the Islamic Republic
of Iran breached its obligations to the United States under Article X of the
1955 Treaty" of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights 6 for which it
owed full reparation to the United States.7 The general references to military
actions "that were dangerous and detrimental to maritime commerce" and to
"vessels" might easily be mistaken for indicia of an actio popularis. It must be
kept in mind, however, that the United States was pursuing its counter-claim
against Iran in its own right as a party to, and in the specific context of a direct
violation of the rights of the United States under, the 1955 Treaty with Iran,
and not by way of diplomatic protection relating to U.S. or alien shipping
interests, whether private or sovereign. The United States did not claim
compensation for harm done to specific vessels.8
Recognizing the territorial limitation imposed by the sole basis of
jurisdiction governing its counter-claim, 9 the United States subsequently
5. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Oral Pleadings), ICJ Doc. CR 2000/26, para. 9 (Nov. 13, 2000)
(Agent of Germany), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm.
6. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, U.S.-Iran, 8
U.S.T. 899, 284 U.N.T.S. 93. Article X, paragraph I provides: "Between the territories of the High
Contracting Parties, there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation."
7. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Merits), I.C.J., paras. 19, 101 (Nov. 6, 2003), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm. All references to Oil Platforms are to the merits phase of the case unless
otherwise specified. See also Oil Platforms (Counter-claim) 1998 I.C.J. at 204, para. 36.
8. The case also did not involve the exercise of any kind of functional protection by the
United States, such as where a state brings a claim in respect of the crew or owners of a ship who do not
have its nationality. Therefore, no issues of nationality or "genuine link," which feature in diplomatic
protection cases, were involved.
9. See Oil Platforms, para. 110.
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modified its counter-claim to read that "in attacking vessels in the Gulf with
mines and missiles and otherwise engaging in military actions that were
dangerous and detrimental to commerce and navigation between the
territories of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic
Republic of Iran breached its obligations to the United States under Article X,
paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty." This modification proved critical from the
perspective of shielding the counter-claim against Iran's objections.
In contrast to the background pertaining to the U.S. attacks giving rise to
Iran's principal claim against the United States,11 the United States was
understood to be bringing both a specific and a generic counter-claim by
relying on a number of attacks on U.S. and non-U.S. flag vessels allegedly
carried out by Iran. 12 Whereas the specific claim focused on individual
attacks, the generic variant alleged that "as a result of the cumulation of
attacks on United States and other vessels, laying mines and otherwise
engaging in military actions in the Persian Gulf, Iran made the Gulf unsafe," 
13
thereby breaching its obligation respecting freedom of commerce and
navigation which the United States should have enjoyed under Article X,
paragraph 1 of the 1955 Treaty.
Iran maintained that the Court should not deal with the merits of the
counter-claim inter alia because the United States, in relying on incidents
involving vessels not flying the U.S. flag, lacked standing to submit a claim
on behalf of third states or of foreign entities that were not parties to this
proceeding.'4 Iran thereby implied that the counter-claim, or at least parts of
it, constituted an inadmissible actio popularis. The "public interest" that the
United States could be said to vindicate by its "generic" counter-claim was to
ensure safe shipping conditions for all in the Gulf.
The Court rejected Iran's objection, not by labeling the U.S. counter-
claim an inadmissible actio popularis, but because in its view the counter-
claim "simply requests the Court to adjudge and declare that the alleged
actions of Iran breached its obligations to the United States, without mention
of any third States."' 5 According to the Court, its limited role was to consider
whether the alleged Iranian actions infringed freedoms guaranteed to the
United States under Article X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty.
10. Id. para. 111 (emphasis in original).
11. The U.S. attacks on the Iranian oil platforms that triggered this case occurred after two
specific attacks on shipping in the Gulf. On October 16, 1987, the Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City, which
had been re-flagged to the U.S., was hit by a missile near Kuwait harbor. Claiming that Iranian oil
platforms were used as a staging facility for attacks by Iranian forces against shipping in the Gulf, the
U.S. attacked and destroyed two Iranian offshore oil production installations in the Reshadat complex
three days later. On April 14, 1988, the U.S. frigate Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine in international
waters near Bahrain. Five days later, the United States attacked and destroyed the Nasr and Salman
platforms belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company. The Court's Judgment of November 6, 2003,
concluded, however, that the attacks against Iranian oil installations carried out by U.S. forces did not
fall within the category of measures justified by the Iran-U.S. Treaty.
12. See Oil Platforms (separate opinion of Judge Simma), para. 38.
13. Oil Platforms, para. 122 (emphasis added).
14. Id. para. 108.
15. Id. para. 109.
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The Court's heavy reliance on the claim as formulated by the applicant
and its focus on the absence of any reference to third states is unconvincing:
without mentioning third-party interests, a claimant can still be considered to
exercise an inadmissible actio popularis in fact. The facts surrounding a claim
should be closely examined in determining whether this is the case. Is the
context giving rise to the claim one of aggression, genocide, slavery, or racial
discrimination? In whose interest is the applicant really claiming? If the
interest essentially is that of a third state and/or its nationals, or if the interest
is only tangentially the applicant's, there is much to be said for dismissing the
claim as an inadmissible actio popularis, especially if it clearly is made
outside the four accepted areas.
III. THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE PROOF OFFERED BY THE UNITED
STATES
In order to succeed on its counter-claim, the United States was held to
prove two things. First, it had to demonstrate that its freedom of commerce or
of navigation "between the territories of the High Contracting Parties" to the
1955 Treaty was actually infringed. Second, it had to prove that the acts which
allegedly impaired one or both of those freedoms were attributable to Iran.
The specific incidents to which the United States referred in support of
its modified counter-claim involved vessels flying the flag, not only of the
United States but also, and primarily, of the Bahamas, Liberia, Panama, the
United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. 16
As regards U.S. flag vessels, the Court pointed out that the 1955 Treaty
protects only vessels that are engaged in commerce or navigation between the
territories of the United States and Iran, and not freedom of navigation in
general. 17
The first of three incidents involving a U.S. flag vessel concerned a mine
attack on a steam tanker in an international shipping channel while en route
from The Netherlands to Kuwait. Therefore, this vessel was not engaged in
commerce or navigation between the United States and Iran. The second
incident involved a missile attack on the Sea Isle City. While this vessel was
flying the U.S. flag, it was proceeding from its anchorage to a Kuwaiti oil
loading terminal and, therefore, was not engaged in commerce or navigation
between the U.S. and Iran. The third incident involved a mine attack on the
U.S. frigate Samuel B. Roberts. As a warship, this vessel by its nature was
excluded from the protection of Article X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty.
Six of the seven other incidents invoked by the United States involved
vessels that were flying the flag of non-U.S. states and were either owned by
U.S. corporations (five) or subject to a U.S. bareboat-charter (one). One of the
vessels involved had no U.S. connection whatsoever.
One of two incidents involving mine attacks concerned a tanker carrying
Iranian light crude from Iran to The Netherlands. This vessel was flying the
flag of Panama while being operated under a U.S. bareboat-charter. The Court
16. Id. para. 120.
17. Id. para. 119.
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concluded that the vessel was not engaged in commerce or navigation
between the United States and Iran, because the process of indirect commerce
in Iranian oil through Western European refineries was outside the ambit of
the Treaty and the vessel's destination was not a U.S. port.' 8 The second mine
attack targeted the supply vessel Anita flying the flag of the United Arab
Emirates and supplying vessels in anchorage, so that this incident also did not
concern a vessel engaged in commerce or navigation between the United
States and Iran.
Two further incidents involved gunboat attacks targeting two U.S.-
owned vessels. The first attack concerned a Liberian-flagged motor tanker en
route to Saudi Arabia from Japan. The second attack targeted a Bahamian-
flagged steam tanker en route from Saudi Arabia to the United States. Based
solely on their itineraries, both vessels were found to lack the protection of the
Treaty.
Another incident involved a missile attack against a Liberian-flagged,
U.S.-owned vessel anchored 10 miles off a Kuwaiti terminal. The Court noted
that the vessel was not engaged in commerce or navigation between the
United Statesand Iran. It came to the same conclusion with regard to a frigate
attack targeting a Liberian-flagged, U.S.-owned motor tanker carrying a load
of Saudi Arabian crude oil from Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates to
Japan. Finally, the Court concluded the same with regard to speedboat attacks
on a British-flagged, U.S.-owned steam tanker carrying a Saudi Arabian cargo
to Qatar and Singapore.
The Court considered that, in the circumstances of this case, a generic
claim of breach of Article X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty could not be sustained
independently of the specific incidents whereby Iran was alleged to have
made the Gulf unsafe. Because none of the incidents individually involved
any interference with the commerce and navigation protected by the 1955
Treaty, they did not accomplish this effect cumulatively. With regard to the
"generic" counter-claim, the Court pointed out that the fact alone that Iran
allegedly made the Gulf unsafe was not sufficient for the Court to decide that
Iran had breached Article X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty. This required a
showing, failing in this case, of "an actual impediment to commerce or
navigation between the territories of the United States and Iran."'
9
In light of the Court's conclusion that none of the vessels described by
the United States as being damaged by Iran's actions was engaged in
commerce or navigation between the territories of the parties to the 1955
Treaty, the entire counter-claim failed on the first condition, and the Court did
not need to address the issue of attribution of the alleged attacks.2°
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF THE JUDGMENT FOR AcTIo POPULARIS CLAIMS
The Court's statements concerning the U.S. counter-claim indicate that,
had the incidents invoked by the United States involved vessels navigating
18. Id. para. 97.
19. Id. para. 123 (emphasis in original).
20. Id. para. 124.
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between U.S. and Iranian ports and otherwise falling within the protection of
the 1955 Treaty, the Court might have accepted incidents targeting non-U.S.
vessels, either individually or cumulatively, as triggering violations under
Article X, paragraph 1 of the Treaty. The decision thus offers a rare hint that
the Court might accept that a state may claim through what is the functional
equivalent of an actio popularis in the areas identified in Barcelona Traction
as obligations erga omnes that all states can be held to have a legal interest in
protecting.
If, and only if, the United States had lacked an interest of its own in
protecting shipping in the Gulf-because there were no attacks on vessels
flying the U.S. flag or having another U.S. connection-an actio popularis
scenario would have arisen. It is unlikely that the Court would have
entertained such a claim here, given that the alleged Iranian attacks in the
Court's view did not rise to the requisite level of an aggression (the only
applicable area identified in Barcelona Traction)-unless it had accepted the
actual or attempted sinking of oil tankers in an international shipping channel
as "environmental aggression." The example of the United Nations
Compensation Commission, which has awarded damages for environmental
aggression by Iraq during the first Gulf War, suggests that this concept is a
part of contemporary international law, and may be enforced by claimants
having a legal interest.
In the end, the Court's apparent willingness in principle to consider
incidents involving non-U.S. flag vessels merely was a function of the limited
basis of jurisdiction underlying the U.S. counter-claim, involving allegations
of direct violations of rights enjoyed by the United States under a bilateral
21treaty. Consequently, it would be a mistake to read too much into theCourt's reasoning concerning the counter-claim.22
V. CONCLUSION
While the incidents on which the United States relied in support of its
counter-claim might have been outside the ambit of the narrow basis of
jurisdiction governing the counter-claim, in the circumstances of this case it
would be wrong to characterize either the U.S. counter-claim as an
21. Judge Simma argues in his separate opinion that the Court's approach in this case is at
odds with the approach it followed in its 1986 Judgment in the Nicaragua case. Oil Platforms (separate
opinion of Judge Simma), paras. 40-41. In the latter case, the Court followed a generic approach rather
than analyzing each incident in detail. He points out that, notwithstanding the fact that the relevant
provisions of the Nicaragua-U.S. and Iran-U.S. treaties are virtually identical, as acknowledged by the
Court (Oil Platforms, para. 107), the Court in 1986 did not consider it necessary to establish whether the
particular vessels harmed by mines were flying the Nicaraguan flag, and whether the vessels concerned
were transporting cargo between the territories of the United States and Nicaragua. As Judge Simma
acknowledges, however, Nicaragua involved determinations of breaches, not only of a bilateral treaty,
as in Oil Platforms, but also of general international law. Moreover, unlike the U.S. counter-claim in Oil
Platforms, the incidents of which Nicaragua complained were not limited to destruction of or damage to
vessels by mining, but involved a host of other incidents and attacks not related to shipping.
22. Indeed, Judge Simma described the reasons for the dismissal of the generic counter-claim
as "plainly inadequate." Oil Platforms (separate opinion of Judge Simma), para. 35. In his view, "such
short shrift thus given to the generic counter-claim can be explained as the Court's reaction to the
somewhat unpersuasive way in which it was pleaded" by the United States. Id. para. 36.
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inadmissible actio popularis or the Court's decision as one revisiting that
doctrine. To characterize the counter-claim in this way would be justified only
if the United States had relied solely on the incident involving the Anita (a
supply vessel that was flying the flag of the United Arab Emirates, was not
U.S.-owned, and was not en route between ports in Iran and the United
States), if there had been no attacks on vessels flying the U.S. flag or having
another U.S. connection and being engaged in Iran-U.S. commerce, and if the
United States had not brought the counter-claim in its own right under the
applicable bilateral treaty protecting commerce and navigation between the
two parties. The United States arguably had a legal interest of its own in
seeking to protect the safety of the Gulf, an international shipping channel
used also for Iran-U.S. commerce covered by a treaty guaranteeing to the
United States the right of freedom of commerce and navigation.
Absent further guidance from the Court as to whether any state has the
right of espousal to protect obligations erga omnes, it remains the rule that
"except in extraordinary circumstances, a State may not extend its protection
to or espouse claims of non-nationals, '23 just as it may not espouse those of
the community-at-large. Those circumstances in the context of the actio
popularis doctrine remain limited to acts of aggression, genocide, slavery, and
racial discrimination. Expanding these areas might run the risk of opening the
floodgates, which explains why the Court skirted the issue raised by Iran. But
this concern is unwarranted if environmental aggression is considered as
included within "acts of aggression" for purposes of the actio popularis
doctrine.
In the current state of affairs, regardless of whether a right of espousal is
recognized, a claim should be dismissed as an inadmissible actio popularis if
it clearly is made outside the four areas accepted in Barcelona Traction and if
the legal interest that the claimant state in fact is seeking to protect is
exclusively that of third states or of private interests not having the claimant's
nationality.
23. First Report on Diplomatic Protection, International Law Commission, 52d Sess., at 34,
para. 94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/506 (2000).
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